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1. Pluralism: Some Varieties 
 
A minimal, possibly uncontroversial, characterization of pluralism requires the same 
thing to be understood differently, as it seems that there is nothing to disagree about where 
different people talk or think of different things.1 Pluralism is commonly intended to convey 
the notion that, at least on certain matters, more than one view is rationally allowed, such that 
two people may disagree on a given question, yet both be justified in their beliefs. However, it 
is not trivial to see how this might work. Rawls’ early distinction between the concept and 
conceptions of justice, for example, suggests that we can disagree about the nature of justice, 
while agreeing that being just is a property of institutions designed to assign basic rights and to 
regulate the distribution of the burdens and benefits of cooperation in a well-ordered society. It 
is far from obvious, however, that this leaves room for pluralism. In fact, it was not Rawls’ 
view in A Theory of Justice that it does. 
Rawls took the concept of justice to express what the different conceptions of justice 
“have in common” in terms of basic properties that just institutions necessarily possess, such 
as that of making “no arbitrary difference among persons in the assigning of rights and duties” 
and that of determining “a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social 
life” (Rawls 1971: 5). People that disagree on the set of principles that should specify the basic 
terms of their association may recognize that each have a conception of justice as long as they 
agree about the essential properties of just institutions, while leaving open the interpretation of 
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the notions of an arbitrary distinction and of a proper balance Rawls 1971: 5). Although the 
latter are intended by Rawls to offer a “description” of just institutions in terms of the notions 
“included in the concept of justice”, one might be tempted to draw a parallel with natural kind 
terms (Putnam 1975: 215 ff.). While the reference of the concept of justice may not be fixed by 
any microphysical fact, it is likely to be fixed by a set of facts concerning social institutions – 
for example, their conforming to principles that can gain acceptance under qualified conditions 
and the psychological background required to settle those conditions – where the nature of the 
relevant facts is the object of the theory of justice. Thus, we might be open to the possibility 
that just institutions are a social kind and that the concept of justice behaves like a kind term 
whose content is fixed by the way the (social) world is, while different conceptions of justice 
represent different theories about just institutions that may be assessed with respect to a variety 
of factors, in particular with respect to how they respond to the demand for efficiency, 
coordination, and stability raised on just institutions  (Rawls 1971: 6). The relevant facts will 
of course largely, although perhaps not fully, depend on human behaviors, actions, and 
attitudes. Yet this does not preclude the concept of justice from having its content fixed 
referentially. If we are permissive enough to grant that mind-dependent properties such as being 
a doorknob fix the content of the relevant concepts (Fodor 1998: 148 ff.), there is no reason 
why the content of social kind terms should not be fixed by social properties, however complex 
their metaphysics may turn out to be.2  
On this\reading, there may at best be one single correct conception of justice, although 
people disagree about the nature of the facts that determine the correctness of claims about 
justice, that is about the truth conditions of those claim (Valentini 2013). Still, in this case, 
people will disagree as a consequence of diverging in the reasons they take to be relevant to 
settling the issue. Different conceptions of justice will thus differ in terms of the justification 
they provide for their respective claims about the nature of just institutions, while their 
proponents would agree that there is a determinate answer to the question. A prima facie case 
for pluralism can be made in this connection by arguing that what count as relevant reasons 
widely differ across persons, communities, and cultures as a consequence of their endorsing 
different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and judgments. Pluralism 
here does not concern the metaphysics, but the epistemology of justice. It does not amount to 
the claim that there are different ways in which things may turn out to be – the claim that the 
facts about just institutions are relative to the way in which justice is conceived – but to the 
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claim that there are different ways in which beliefs and judgments about justice may be 
assessed. Telling epistemology apart from metaphysics thus helps us to make sense of the idea 
that there may be a genuine case for pluralism in relation to justice.3 The interesting case rests 
on  whether we can expect convergence in this domain among people talking and thinking about 
the same thing. The claim for pluralism here concerns the standards, methods, and norms for 
forming belief and judgment about certain kinds of facts, rather than the nature of facts 
themselves. 
Borrowing from epistemology, however, we may distinguish between a descriptive and 
a normative understanding of this claim. Descriptive pluralism is the “simple, non-normative 
thesis that different communities, cultures, networks, and so on, endorse different epistemic 
systems – that is, different set of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other 
doxastic states” (Goldman 2010: 187). This weak, descriptive reading allows for principled 
ways to adjudicate controversial issues. Disagreement follows from the fallible nature of our 
rational capacities, the limited evidence we have access to, the different background beliefs and 
collateral information each of the parties relies on, and different methods and norms for forming 
beliefs and judgment. Yet disagreement in this case is virtually contingent, given that no 
principled limit is set to the possibility of arguing about evidence and the standards by which it 
is assessed. Nothing prevents even basic background assumptions and fundamental epistemic 
principles from being subject to critical reflection so that disagreements may, on principle, be 
settled by argument (Feldman 2007: 206). Pluralism here ultimately collapses into a modest, 
reasonably uncontroversial, fallibilistic claim. People are allowed to diverge, because they 
happen to form their beliefs and judgments in different ways, yet they may be expected to 
converge in the long run, at least under epistemically ideal conditions. The converse, normative 
view is that there is a plurality of epistemic systems, yet no fact of the matter about which is 
the right or better one (Goldman 2010. 188). According to this stronger reading disagreement 
may run deep, given that there are different sets of norms, standards or principles governing 
how beliefs and judgments are formed, but there is no fact of the matter as to whether some of 
them are more correct than others. This kind of pluralism differs from descriptive pluralism in 
that it takes stance  on the normative issue of whether some norms, standards or principles are 
better than others. On this normative reading, however, pluralism entails a hardly feasible 
relativist claim that follows from the conjunction of three claims: (1) there are no absolute facts 
about what a particular item of information justifies; (2) judgments such as “E justifies belief 
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B” express the claim: “According to the epistemic system C, information E justifies belief B”; 
(3) there are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, but no 
facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others (Boghossian 
2006: 73). In this case, there seems to be no way in which agreement can be reached by 
argument about deeply controversial issues, because people holding different epistemic system 
diverge on what may count as a reason for belief. 
The lesson seems to be that, if pluralism is to have a distinct standing, it needs to rest 
on grounds that are stronger than fallibilism, yet weaker than relativism, thus ruling out both 
“deep” disagreement and the view that convergence can be expected. For on the one hand, 
relativism would be vindicated, if disagreement would follow from “a clash of framework 
propositions” and/or “underlying principles” that “cannot be resolved through the use of 
argument”, for in this case the conditions essential to arguing are undercut (Fogelin 1985: 8). 
While, on the other hand, fallibilism would be sufficient to account for disagreement,if it would 
be sensible to expect convergence. A viable understanding of pluralism thus seems to involve 
recognizing that, at least in some domains, convergence cannot be expected among persons 
who are broadly equal in their capacity to reason, acquire information, assess evidence and 
arguments, and engage in critical reflection, while accepting what has been labeled as “the 
uniqueness thesis”, that is the claim that in principle a body of evidence justifies at most one 
attitude toward a proposition (Feldman 2007: 205).  
This seems to be the rationale behind the idea of reasonable pluralism as a view about 
justification that is relevant to political philosophy and deeply differs from relativism, namely 
the view that people that are equally endowed with the power of reason and apply common 
epistemic standards, while being willing to propose fair terms of cooperation, may be unable to 
agree upon the comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious doctrines that underlay their 
(different) conceptions of justice (Cohen 1993: 282; Larmore 1996: 154). According to this 
view, disagreement is likely to occur and be resilient among broad epistemic peers. This 
qualification is important, as individuals may be defined as epistemic peers in either a strict or 
a broad sense. Under the strict reading, peerness requires both evidence possession and 
evidence processing to be the same. Under the broad reading, it only requires rational capacities 
and skills to be such that others cannot be taken to be more likely to be wrong than oneself 
(Elga 2007, Peters 2013, Matheson 2015). In the latter case, it may be true both that only a 
single conception is correct and that there are principled ways to adjudicate the issue, yet 
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convergence is not likely to occur where differences in evidence, in the way it is assessed, and 
in background information affect the process of belief formation. This may sound too weak to 
claim pluralism, given that nothing here seems to prevent disagreements from being overcome 
by critical reflection and rational discussion, at least in principle. Both evidence and background 
information might be expected be shared by the end of the inquiry, provided that no principled 
limit is set to the possibility of argument and that people exercise their power of reason. 
However, a key assumption behind the notion of a reasonable pluralism is that even “reflective 
convergence” is not to be expected at least in domains where the process of belief formation is 
peculiarly complex, like the moral domain (Cohen 1993: 281-82).4 Reasonable pluralism seems 
thus to devise a kind of normative pluralism that is designed to steer clear of relativism. It 
preserves the claim that disagreements may not admit of rational resolution, while carefully 
avoiding to claim that there may be many different, fundamentally alternative ways of forming 
beliefs and judgment, yet no facts by virtue of which one may be better than others. Political 
liberalism is intended to answer this predicament by advancing justice as fairness as a free-
standing conception of justice that abstains from ontological and epistemic commitment in the 
justification of political principles. In the next sections, I argue that this is an unstable position 
and suggest that an epistemic view of deliberation may be better suited to making sense of 
political justification. The latter view, however, is bound to dispense with normative pluralism. 
 
 
2. Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement 
 
The issue with pluralism, understood as outlined above, is different from the questions 
arising in connection with value pluralism, understood as the doctrine that there is a plurality 
of incommensurable and mutually incompatible, equally ultimate values. In fact, as noted by 
Larmore (1996: 154), the latter is itself a controversial doctrine about the nature or the source 
of value, which is not more likely to attract convergence than any other. What is meant to raise 
the problem of pluralism in the present context is rather the view that a plurality of reasonable 
and yet incompatible religious, moral, and philosophical doctrines is “the normal result of the 
exercise of human reason” in a democratic society (Rawls 1993: xviii). Pluralism thus follows 
from the possibility of reasonable disagreement, where people are taken to be reasonable if they 
are willing to accept what Rawls terms the burdens of judgment – together with being willing 
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to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them, provided that others do so (Rawls 
1993: 54). In explaining how reasonable disagreement is possible, Rawls of course rules out 
irrationality and lack of intelligence as well as the idea that different views reflect different 
interests, rejecting them as “too easy” answers to the question at stake. What needs to be 
explained is indeed that disagreement occurs among people who apparently hold their views in 
good faith and are broadly equal in their capacity for reasoning and critical reflection, given 
that they all “share a common human reason”. The sources of disagreement must therefore be 
“the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason 
and judgment in the ordinary course of political life” (Rawls 1993: 55-56). This means that 
reasonable people (1) do not affirm their views dogmatically, (2) do not endorse significantly 
different norms of belief formation – thus providing no case for epistemic pluralism (Weinberg, 
Stich, Nichols 2001) – and (3) do not use their powers of reason incorrectly. The sources of 
disagreement listed by Rawls are thus designed to account for disagreement among broad 
epistemic peers. People are not taken to possess exactly the same evidence and to process it in 
exactly the same way, yet they are taken to be in an equally good epistemic position regarding 
the issue at stake. The burdens of judgment are traced back to the following circumstances – 
note that only the last two are specific to the moral and political domains. 
 
1) evidence can be conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate; 
2) even where we agree abut the considerations that are relevant, we may disagree about 
their weight. 
3) to some extent, all concepts are vague and thus subject to interpretation; 
4) the way we assess evidence, and weigh moral and political values, is shaped to some 
extent by our total experience, which naturally differs; 
5) different normative considerations may carry different force, and it is difficult to 
make an  overall assessment difficult; 
6) setting priorities and making adjustment among different moral and political values 
involves hard decisions that may seem to have no clear answer (Rawls 1993: 57) 
 
The implication of the burdens of judgment is that “reasonable people do not all affirm 
the same comprehensive doctrine”, conceived as an intelligible view of the world that draws 
upon a tradition of thought and covers major religious, philosophical and moral aspects of 
 7 
human life (Rawls 1993: 59). Rawls’ proposal, however, differs from those advanced in the 
peer disagreement literature. On the one hand, Rawls clearly holds that it is both rational and 
reasonable for each party to hold their own judgment true (Rawls 1993: 60). The rationale for 
this is that each is likely to have good reason to be confident, on reflection, in their own 
judgment. While understanding that alternatives are reasonable from different perspectives, it 
seems that in this case one may be justified in thinking that one’s own assessment of the 
evidence and weighted considerations are on the right track, along with one’s interpretations of 
vague concepts and the relative force of one’s normative considerations and priority-setting. 
Given that controversial beliefs are arrived at in ways that one is confident with and that there 
are no specific grounds for doubting one’s own exercise of the power of reason, disagreement 
appears to be no defeater.5 This rules out the argument that peer disagreement provides us with 
a reason for revising our judgment, suspending our belief, or lowering our confidence in the 
relevant propositions as a way to conciliate with others whose judgment is equally likely to be 
right, as proponents of so-called conciliatory views advise, and certain trends in deliberative 
democracy seem to suggest by claiming, for example, that economizing on moral disagreement 
or balancing one’s own and others’ perspectives is both the expected and desirable output of 
deliberation (Gutman, Thompson 2004: 134, Goodin 2003: 183).  
On the other hand, although reasonable people are justified in holding to their views in 
the face of disagreement, they are not in a position to “insist, when fundamental political 
questions are at stake, on what they take as true” (Rawls 1993: 61). This marks a departure from 
the “steadfast views” advanced in the literature as an alternative to conciliatory views. The 
rationale seems to be twofold. First, reasonable people recognize that their own doctrine is “but 
one reasonable doctrine among others” and that therefore they can raise no special claim over 
other equally reasonable people who affirm different views (Rawls 1993: 60). Second, insisting 
on the truth of one’s own view would amount to claiming legitimate authority to take it as a 
basis for deciding on the constitutional essentials or basic questions of justice, and to use 
coercive power to repress other comprehensive views that are not unreasonable – which itself 
counts as unreasonable as long as a shared basis of justification for comprehensive doctrines is 
lacking (Rawls 1993: 61). In this respect, being reasonable is not just an epistemological stance, 
but is connected with “the political ideal of a democratic citizenship that includes what free and 
equal citizen can require of each other with respect to their reasonable comprehensive views” 
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(Rawls 1993: 62). By granting that each party is justified in believing their own comprehensive 
doctrine to be true, the burdens of judgment limit what may be reasonably justified to others.  
Rawls’ treatment of disagreement thus neither recommends conciliation, nor can be 
taken to vouch for a steadfast view. What is specific to Rawls’ solution is rather to hold that 
political justifications should avoid ontological and epistemic commitment. In the face of 
reasonable disagreement, a political conception of justice should be free-standing with respect 
to the ontological and epistemic commitments of comprehensive doctrines in order to be 
possibly justified to those who are bound by it. This means that, while being a part “that fits 
into and can be supported by” any reasonable comprehensive doctrine, it is not derived from 
any of them and does not take stance on whether one of them is true (Rawls 1993: 12, 128). 
The limits set on what can be justified to others make no reference to truth here, given that 
reasonableness, not truth, is the standard, and reasonableness follows from a specifically 
political moral psychology that draws on “a scheme of concepts and principles for expressing 
a political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship” (Rawls 1993: 87) What makes 
the latter specifically political is the fact that they are not advanced as truths about human nature 
to be settled by metaphysical reflection or empirical discovery, but rather as a set of concepts 
and principles of practical reason entailed by the fundamental ideas that are found in the 
political culture of democratic societies (Rawls 1993: 13-14, 86-87, 126-127). Note that, 
according to this reading, the part of moral psychology that is specific to political philosophy 
turns out to be sui generis, given that it can be neither covered by a priori philosophical 
reasoning, nor by a posteriori scientific psychology. This results in the idea that public 
justification only indirectly depends on reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Public 
justification is only possible insofar as an overlapping consensus among comprehensive 
doctrines is found on a political conception of justice that provides common ground for public 
discussion, yet it is worked out by citizens “within the bounds of the political”, as the contents 
of comprehensive doctrines play “no normative role” in this context (Rawls 1996: 387-88). In 
other words, public justification conforms to the sui generis standards of political justification 
that are settled by political liberalism as a free-standing conception of justice: 
 
Political liberalism does not use the concept of moral truth applied to its own political 
(always moral) judgments. Here it says that political judgments are reasonable or 
unreasonable; and it lays out political ideals, principles, and standards as criteria of the 
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reasonable. These criteria in turn are connected with the two basic features of reasonable 
persons as citizens: first, their willingness to propose and to abide by, if accepted, what 
they think others as equal citizens with them might reasonably accept as fair terms of 
social co-operation; and, second, their willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment 
and accept the consequences thereof. For the political purpose of discussing questions 
of constitutional essentials and basic justice, political liberalism views this idea of the 
reasonable as sufficient. The use of the concept of truth is not rejected or questioned, 
but left to comprehensive doctrines to use or deny, or use some other idea instead. 




3. Political Justification and Truth 
 
Reasons for resisting this conclusion have been put forward in the literature. In this 
section, I will consider Cohen’s objection and draw some conclusions that bear on Habermas’ 
epistemic view of deliberation. Cohen argues that in political justification we cannot “do 
without the concept of truth” as Rawls contends, because truth is connected “with the concept 
of belief and meaning, both fundamental in the account of thought” and (hence) with the very 
idea of a reasoning process (Cohen 2009: 13-14)). First, belief is commonly taken to “aim at 
truth”, in that truth is the standard of correctness for beliefs and their behavior is thus governed 
by rational norms or subject to ceteris paribus laws connected with their semantic properties: 
for instance, it is rational to revise a belief that P when confronted with evidence that P is false 
(Cohen 2009: 13). In the same vein, believing that Q and (if Q then P) leads to believing that 
P, perceiving that P leads to believing that P, believing that an action promotes a desired state 
of affairs leads to performing that action and so on. In this sense, beliefs are routinely taken to 
be functional states whose representational properties are connected with the role they play in 
psychological processes (Fodor 1985, see also Millikan 1984: 139-40). Second, reasoning 
processes are commonly conceived as rational transitions among mental states insofar as they 
are governed by epistemic norms connected with truth – for example, norms that require them 
to be truth-preserving or reliably truth-conducive (Cohen 2009: 14, see Goldman 2012; 
Goldman 2014). Given that truth is the standard of correctness for belief and reasoning 
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processes are governed by epistemic norms, deliberation may be said to aim for truth in the 
sense that, when deliberating whether to believe that P we “aim to determine whether P is true” 
(Cohen 2009: 13-14). Cohen is drawn to conclude that we can hardly imagine what it would 
mean to conduct political justification without recourse to the concept of truth (Cohen 2009: 
15). The point is that, on this view, it is inconsistent to allow judgment and reasoning in political 
justification while contending that the concept of truth has no application in this context:  
 
[…] Rawls’ proposal is to endorse a cognitivist understanding of political conceptions 
of justice and political argument on which notions of judgment, reasoning, and argument 
are fully in play, while denying the availability of the concept of truth within such 
conceptions. The concern is specifically with the concept of truth, and the reason for 
leaving it out cannot be that political discourse traffics in something other than truth 
bearers. Someone might offer that rationale for the view that truth has no place in 
political argument, but not if they think of political argument as an exercise of public 
reason. (Cohen 2009: 19)6 
 
 
Cohen’s suggests, however, that political liberalism can be emended by establishing a 
political concept of truth that is tailored to suit the need for a cognitive understanding of 
political justification without dispensing with reasonable pluralism. The point is that it is not 
truth itself that is divisive and prevents agreement. The latter view is motivated by the fact that 
two inconsistent propositions cannot both be true, while they may both be reasonable to believe. 
Thus, asserting that a particular account of justice is true commits one to denying that any 
conflicting accounts are true, while asserting that it is reasonable is compatible with accepting 
that others are reasonable too. Reasonableness is compatible with pluralism, while truth is not, 
because of its “singularity”: the singularity of truth seems to make it incompatible with 
pluralism and therefore unsuitable for public reason (Cohen 2009: 29). Cohen’s argument 
against this view comes in three steps. First, public reason clearly admits of no less divisive 
concepts and standards. Given that there is more than one political conception of justice, we 
may disagree about which view is most reasonable. Furthermore, we may disagree about what 
justice requires, for instance about whether it requires equal or maximin basic liberties. In such 
cases, we cannot all be right, although we are reasonable. Second, deploying the concept of 
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truth in raising our respective claims within public reason would add nothing to the 
disagreement we face: it would just express it. Third, the concept of truth may be used within 
public reason, provided that we endorse a reasonable attitude toward truth itself – that is, 
provided that we acknowledge that being true is not a sufficient condition for a proposition to 
play a role in political arguments, since reasonable people acknowledge that true propositions 
may fail to gain acceptance from others that are equally reasonable and are thus prepared to 
find reasons that are compelling to others (Cohen 1996: 100, As a consequence, not all true 
propositions count as relevant within public reason because the truth of a proposition does not 
“suffice […] to make an appeal to it appropriate in political justification” (Cohen 1999: 31-32).  
On this view, truth claims need not be denied application in the political domain, but 
their relevance is constrained by reasonableness. The truth of a proposition is relevant to 
political justification only insofar as it rests on shared ground and therefore “an appropriate but 
limited role of judgments about truth” is licensed “on that shared ground” Cohen 2009: 35). 
Once so qualified, the concept of truth may be kept and may play a role in political justification. 
This debunks the argument against public reason that was initially suggested, namely that 
public reason cannot support a cognitivist view of political justification because doing without 
truth precludes grasping what an argument, a judgment, or a reasoning process can possibly 
amount to. Cohen suggests that the concept of truth in play here should be labeled “the political 
concept of truth” (Cohen  2009: 37).7 
Does this proposal square with the role of truth in cognitive processes? The political 
conception is designed to be “suited for the purposes of political reflection and argument in a 
pluralistic democracy, characterized by doctrinal disagreements” (Cohen 2009: 3). Suppose 
people disagree on the principles of justice or on what justice requires. We have seen that this 
is entirely possible, given that there is a multitude of reasonable conception of justice. Their 
disagreement may be expressed in this context by saying that they disagree about the truth of a 
proposition P. Now suppose that deliberation leads them to overcome their disagreement by 
reasoning from shared premises. On the assumption that they exercise their rational powers 
correctly, the reasoning process will lead them to the truth, if the premises they share are 
themselves true, but will otherwise lead them to the wrong deliberative output. Reasoning 
correctly from false premises, they will be drawn to a false conclusion, which cannot possibly 
count as a desirable outcome if we take deliberations to aim at truth. If the cognitive role of 
truth is to be preserved, we should rather want false premises to be revised – ideally at least – 
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in order to avoid false conclusions. Thus, it is hard to see how the argument for the relevance 
of truth to the cognitive understanding of political argument can be squared with the view that 
false propositions may license correct conclusions within public reason. Public reason requires 
that arguments be carried out on shared ground, yet it would be wrong to accept a proposition 
that follows from false premises because they are reasonable. We cannot require truth to play a 
role in public reason and be unconcerned about accepting consequences that follows from false 
premises.  
Yet Cohen must allow that a false conclusion is acceptable, provided that it follows from 
considerations that are reasonable, although false.. Public reason here draws on reasons that are 
shared across reasonable conceptions and provide no independent ground on which to sort out 
false premises. Permissible considerations thus are likely to include false premises, as long as 
there is a variety of reasonable conceptions of justice that cannot be jointly true, and some of 
them will entail false principles or beliefs. Cohen thus claims, not only that being true is not a 
sufficient condition to count as a reason in political justification, but also that it is not a 
necessary condition either, given that some views of justice, while false, may be reasonable: 
“what matters for democracy’s public reason is reasonableness, not truth” (Cohen 2009: 31).  
It has been argued on this basis that Cohen’s political concept of truth is expressive 
rather than operative, because it does no real work in political justifications. More specifically, 
it does not perform the function of separating considerations that could count in deliberation 
from considerations that could not, given that false propositions play exactly the same 
justificatory role as true ones under the constraints imposed by reasonableness to the use of 
truth in political argument (Butler 2016). Participants can thus express their disagreement in 
terms of conflicting truth claims, but cannot appeal to truth according to the role it plays in 
deliberation – where false beliefs are subject to revision because “when we deliberate about 
whether to believe that P, we try to determine whether P (is true)” (Cohen 2009: 13-14). In this 
sense, Cohen’s alternative seems forced to retreat to epistemic abstinence, because it precludes 
deliberation from playing any epistemic role. The crux is that Cohen cannot allow what counts 
as shared ground to be shaken by considerations about truth, as truth would constrain the 
reasonable in this case, rather than the contrary. Yet this is not compatible with maintaining 
that truth plays a role in political justification. If truth is to be relevant in political justification, 
we should expect false premises to be revised wherever possible in order to avoid false 
conclusions. Thus, any proposition within the set of propositions that count as shared ground 
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should be possibly assessed for truth and removed should it turn out false. Any, consideration 
relevant to the truth of such propositions, including considerations that concern the 
comprehensive doctrines on which they draw, would therefore be relevant to political 
justification. In fact, it would contribute to shape the space of public reason. The very idea of 
imposing a reasonableness constraint on public reason would collapse.  
A converse case is made by Ingham (2016) for showing that comprehensive doctrines 
may be affected by arguments that move from shared true premises. As illustrated by Cohen 
(2009: 30-31), disagreements within public reason may concern some proposition that can be 
inferred from a reasonable comprehensive doctrine when combined with auxiliary premises 
that are common ground. By hypothesis, in such cases, people may reasonably argue within 
public reason to the effect that the target proposition is false and, by modus tollens, any reason 
to reject it will count in this context as a public reason to reject some of the premises from 
which it is derived. Shared auxiliary premises, however, are allegedly true. Therefore, some of 
the premises that draw on the relevant comprehensive doctrine must be false, It follows that 
one can argue from within public reason to the effect that a comprehensive doctrine is, at least 
partly, false.  
While the former case showed that considerations concerning the truth of  
comprehensive doctrines may affect public reason, the latter shows that arguments conducted 
within public reason may affect the truth of comprehensive doctrines. The upshot is that 
granting the concept of truth an “operative” role in political justification leaves no room for 
constraining public reason. As long as we take the concept of truth to be connected to the 
cognitive properties of political justification, we are bound to conclude that we cannot have 




4. Pluralism and deliberation 
 
This comes as no surprise under a cognitivist understanding of belief and rationality. 
Evidence that P is false normally leads to revision of the belief that P and other the beliefs it 
entails. How can this fail to be relevant to public reason? It is sensible to claim that public 
reason is not committed to the whole truth (Cohen 2009: 34-5). Yet, we have seen that 
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recognizing or failing to recognize the truth of a proposition may be relevant to deliberation, 
whether or not the proposition is presently included in the set of premises that count as shared 
ground. Conversely, arguments conducted within public reason to the effect that a proposition 
is false may affect the comprehensive doctrine from which the target proposition is derived. In 
other words, arguments to the effect that a certain proposition is true or false are likely to affect 
public reason with respect to the target proposition and the propositions it entails, regardless of 
whether they are shared ground. On the one hand, there is no way to insulate public reason from 
controversial truth claims connected to comprehensive doctrines, because the revision of beliefs 
that are no part of what counts as shared ground may affect the deliberative resolution of 
disagreements within public reason. On the other hand, there is no way to insulate 
comprehensive doctrines from arguments raised within public reason, as the latter may affect 
the former by way of mudus tollens.  
What is taken to be common ground is therefore likely to shift over time as a result of 
arguments that turn on propositions which are far removed from what counts as shared among 
reasonable people at a certain time and place. It follows that what is relevant to public reason 
can be hardly be constrained by reasonability, given that no restriction can be set on the 
considerations that count in favor of or against political principles or public choices. Thus 
understood, however, public reason looks closer to Habermas’ epistemic view of the public use 
of reason than to Rawls’ distinctively political view. As long as the epistemic role of 
deliberation is left intact, the idea of a political liberalism is not just supplemented with a 
suitably constrained concept of political truth, but replaced by a rather demanding view of 
deliberation, according to which convergence among broad epistemic peers is to be expected at 
least in idealized conditions (Habermas 1995. 117-18)  
Deliberation is in fact allowed to be guided by epistemic norms insofar as rightness is 
(taken to be) “on the same plane as propositional truth” and reasons enjoy causal powers with 
respect to beliefs (Habermas 1995: 123; Habermas 2003: 247-48; Forst, 2015). Although in this 
context rightness is something we discover by argument and the value of democracy goes 
therefore beyond the intrinsic and expressive properties of the democratic procedure, no meta-
ethical commitment follows in relation to the standard against which deliberation is assessed 
(Landemore 2017). Rather, a two steps procedure is proposed for sorting out the right from the 
good that is supposedly free of substantive normative presuppositions (Habermas 1995: 115-
16). First, principles derived from conflicting comprehensive views of the good candidate to 
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moral norms if and only if they are objective – in somewhat different terms, if they respond to 
agent-neutral reasons. Second, putative moral norms are tested by argument for their 
responsiveness to generalizable interests (Habermas 1990: 65-66, Habermas 1998: 81-82). 
Deliberation here preserves its natural epistemic properties, while the borderline between the 
good and the right is drawn according to what may turn out to be accepted in the light of 
argument. Thus, neither convergence on comprehensive truths, nor doctrinal agreement is 
required. In fact, convergence may be reached on moral norms that are not included in any 
comprehensive doctrine, because it is generated by the deliberative process and no restriction 
is set on what can be subject to revision. Cohen’s proposal, on the contrary, is designed to 
prevent the output of deliberation to depart from comprehensive doctrines – given that 
deliberation cannot turn out to backfire on what is taken to be shared ground. In this sense, 
politically true beliefs are granted to preserve given doctrines. One may wonder how this might 
add anything epistemic to the idea of an overlapping consensus. Conversely, where deliberation 
is credited with epistemic properties, it can be taken to yield genuine public reasons precisely 
because deliberative outputs differs from overlapping consensus in that they do not depend on 
contingent agreement among comprehensive doctrines (Habermas 1996: 114, Forst 2012: 92-
93).  
On the latter view, pluralism is addressed in a different way. Deliberation in fact does 
not need to “bracket the pluralism of convictions and world-views from the outset”, because it 
is not designed to record overlapping consensus, but to yield a “we-perspective” that can be 
naturally expected to emerge as the practice of argumentation “enjoins those involved to an 
idealizing enlargement of their interpretive perspectives.” (Habermas 1995: 117). An attractive 
feature of this framework is that reasonable and unreasonable people are treated in the same 
way, as the requirements for participating in public deliberation are fairly minimal.8 Normative 
pluralism however fades away. While a fallibilistic attitude that comes close to accepting the 
burdens of judgment is retained, in fact, disagreement can only be contingently rational here, 
since no principled restriction is set on arguing about both evidence and the way it is assessed, 
so that even the most well-entrenched beliefs and basic epistemic principles are subject to 
revision (Habermas 1995: 117-18). On this reading, the burdens of judgment set no principled 
constraint to public arguments designed to screen out ethical values from moral norms. Having 
formed their moral beliefs in different ways and in accordance with different religious or 
metaphysical worldviews, people may happen to diverge in what they advance as putative 
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moral norms, yet nothing prevents disagreement to be met by argument. Conversely, the idea 
that there is a plurality of conceptions of the good life is preserved only insofar as these are 
credited with raising a sui generis claim to authenticity (Habermas 1995: 125-26). Pluralism 
here is descriptive, not normative.  
It has been suggested in this connection that the rationale for endorsing reasonable 
pluralism is that there is something specific to political morality connected with the social 
function that agreement performs in the political domain. On this reading, politics diverges 
from both epistemology and ethics because of the pressure to agree on a cooperative scheme 
(MacMahon 2006: 8 ff., 33, 69-70). Descriptive pluralism here may seem enough to raise a 
normative problem about the conditions under which agreement is reached, as convergence 
under epistemically ideal conditions is no solution for actual disagreements and actual people 
cannot wait for rightness to emerge at the end of the inquiry before engaging in social 
cooperation. There are two problems with this view, however. First, idealizations are involved 
in any view of public reason and Rawls’ abstinent view fares no better in this respect than full-
blown epistemic conceptions of deliberation (Enoch 2015: 117-18, 127 ff.). Second, 
epistemically ideal conditions are better understood as a standard against which arguments are 
assessed rather than as a set of conditions to be met in order for something to count at all as a 
justification (Putnam 1981: 55). Although defeasible, arguments that fall short of meeting 
epistemically ideal conditions may still supply best evidence available for the time being and 
thus, while imperfect and subject to revision, attract sufficient (provisional) convergence, 
provided that public discussion abides by ordinary epistemic norms. In this respect, political 
disagreement is not special. Also, supplementing deliberation with a voting procedure seems 
sensible wherever arguments de facto fail to settle disagreement (Peters 2013). Mixed models 
have been proposed in this spirit over the last decades to combine deliberative and aggregative 
theories of democracy, building on the idea that, while it may not be realistic to expect public 
deliberation to generate consensus on any specific issue, it is not unrealistic to expect that a 
meta-consensus can be generated on the relevant dimensions of choice (Dryzek, List 2003). 
Nothing here suggests that disagreement cannot be met by argument or that it can only be met 
by refraining from epistemic commitment. 
Reasonable pluralism seems to raise a claim that is more demanding than descriptive 
pluralism, while avoiding collapse into relativism, and to recommend epistemic abstinence as 
to demarcate the space of public reason. This is an unstable position. On the one hand, it is 
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questionable that a genuine case for normative pluralism can be made on its basis. The burdens 
of judgment may account for how disagreement arises among broad epistemic peers, but 
provide no principled reason to think that it cannot be addressed by critical reflection and public 
argument. On the other hand, it is questionable that public reason can be constrained by 
reasonableness. For endorsing epistemic abstinence prevents political justification from 
drawing on a cognitivist conception of belief and reasoning, while taking the latter seriously 
ultimately dismantles the case for normative pluralism. The upshot is, I think, unsurprising. 
Normative pluralism – be it reasonable or not – conflicts with the idea that there is something 
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1 Cf. Boghossian 2007: 39 ff.,  Hare 1991 148, see however Plunkett, Sundell (2013) for critical discussion.  
2 Externalism about social kinds is endorsed by Guala 2016, and at least suggested by Epstein 2015.  
3 This does not per se invite moral realism, because the distinction does not depend on whether moral facts are 
mind-dependent. Mind-dependence may be hold true, in keeping with moral constructivism of any variety, yet 
pluralism won’t follow unless moral truths are relativized to particular points of view (Bagnoli 2015). What is 
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specific to metaphysical pluralism is indeed the claim that facts vary according to contingent conceptions of what 
there is, and thus are relative to cultures, interests, and beliefs that may diverge across times and places. It is in 
this sense that, as noted above, metaphysical pluralism leaves no room for disagreement, because people holding 
different conceptions would be talking and thinking about different things (Boghossian 2007: 39 ff.). 
4 As we will see, this is different from Elga’s suggestion that moral disagreement is intractable because there are 
no epistemic peers in the moral domain, since moral beliefs are embedded in a wider web of beliefs concerning 
moral and non moral issues (Elga 2007). In fact there is no reason to think that even deeply entrenched beliefs are 
immune to argument and thus it is sensible to consider not only that disagreements often take place against a 
background of broad moral and non moral agreement (Rowland 2016), but also that the latter can be established 
by argument when needed, unless this possibility is ruled out by further considerations about the nature of moral 
disagreement. Elga’s point does not suffice to preclude epistemic peerness in the moral domain. 
5 See Wedgewood 2007: 261-63; Enoch 2010, Knanving 2014: 116-17. 
6 Of course, this would not be the case under a noncognitivist understanding of political discourse, yet the latter is 
not consistent with the idea of public reason (Cohen 2009: 17) 
7 Political truth is constrained by reasonableness both with respect to the truths implicated in comprehensive 
doctrines and with respect to philosophical theories of truth. However, it preserves the idea of correspondence 
under a metaphysically uncommitted reading by detaching the concept of truth from the philosophical theory of 
truth that takes correspondence to be a relation between propositions and a mind-independent metaphysical kind 
of entity – facts, for instance – working as truth makers (Cohen 2009: 3-4, 27). The political concept of truth thus 
advances nothing but the plain, ordinary view that flows from Aristotle’s formulation that telling the truth amounts 
to “saying of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not” (Metaphysics VII, 1011b 25-26). In fact, no 
ontological commitment is built into it (Davidson 2005: 126-27). Introducing a political concept of truth therefore 
does not amount to advancing a new, or different, or in any way restricted concept of truth. The restriction rather 
concerns the topics that are amenable to be assessed for truth in this context. 
8 The requirement to access public deliberation ultimately amounts to nothing more than a disposition to subject 
to the authority of argument, which is connected to the “socio-ontological constitution of the public practice of 
argumentation” in that participants mutually recognize themselves as minimally free and equal rational beings 
(Habermas 1995: 127, see Habermas 1990: 89 ff.), yet does not involve endorsing a specific political concept of 
persons and focus on the content of moral beliefs rather than on their being believed. For further discussion, see 
Ferrara 2014: 90-92 and Enoch 2015: 120 ff., 130 ff.) Any full-blown deliberative approach will of course 
characterize deliberative rationality in one way or another, yet it is questionable that this amounts to advancing a 
comprehensive doctrine (Rawls 1993: 132; cf. Forst 2012: 91-92). For one thing, the view that humans share a 
common power of reason is equally crucial, as we have seen above, to Rawls’ ideas of reasonable disagreement 
and public reason. For another, a theory of deliberative rationality may rest on relatively minimal grounds by 
drawing on empirical theories designed to account for basic universal capacities of reasoning, agency, and social 
cognition (Habermas 1990: 31-32, 1984: 363 ff.).  
